Project: https://<before-project>.supabase.co · run 2026-11-22T15:46:28.258Z · 10 tables, 1 functions, 34 requests
Findings: 14 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low, 0 info
1. [CRITICAL] Anyone with the public key can read "clients" without signing in (2+ rows returned).
- Check: anon-read on
clients - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,name,contact_name,contact_email,notes,created_at - Why it matters: The rows include contact_email, notes. The public key ships in your website's JavaScript, so this is readable by anyone.
- Fix: Enable RLS on "clients" (alter table public.clients enable row level security) and add policies that name the signed-in owner. If it must be public, expose a view with only the safe columns.
2. [CRITICAL] User A can read 1 row(s) of "clients" that belong to user B.
- Check: cross-user-read on
clients - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,name,contact_name,contact_email,notes,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "clients" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (org_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on org_id.
3. [CRITICAL] User B can read 1 row(s) of "clients" that belong to user A.
- Check: cross-user-read on
clients - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,name,contact_name,contact_email,notes,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "clients" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (org_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on org_id.
4. [CRITICAL] Anyone with the public key can read "invoices" without signing in (2+ rows returned).
- Check: anon-read on
invoices - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,client_id,project_id,number,status,currency,issued_on,due_on,total,paid_at,stripe_session_id,created_at - Why it matters: The rows include total, stripe_session_id. The public key ships in your website's JavaScript, so this is readable by anyone.
- Fix: Enable RLS on "invoices" (alter table public.invoices enable row level security) and add policies that name the signed-in owner. If it must be public, expose a view with only the safe columns.
5. [CRITICAL] User A can read 1 row(s) of "invoices" that belong to user B.
- Check: cross-user-read on
invoices - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,client_id,project_id,number,status,currency,issued_on,due_on,total,paid_at,stripe_session_id,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "invoices" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (org_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on org_id.
6. [CRITICAL] User B can read 1 row(s) of "invoices" that belong to user A.
- Check: cross-user-read on
invoices - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,client_id,project_id,number,status,currency,issued_on,due_on,total,paid_at,stripe_session_id,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "invoices" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (org_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on org_id.
7. [CRITICAL] Anyone with the public key can read "organizations" without signing in (2+ rows returned).
- Check: anon-read on
organizations - Columns exposed:
id,name,slug,owner_id,stripe_customer_id,created_at - Why it matters: The rows include stripe_customer_id. The public key ships in your website's JavaScript, so this is readable by anyone.
- Fix: Enable RLS on "organizations" (alter table public.organizations enable row level security) and add policies that name the signed-in owner. If it must be public, expose a view with only the safe columns.
8. [CRITICAL] User A can read 1 row(s) of "organizations" that belong to user B.
- Check: cross-user-read on
organizations - Columns exposed:
id,name,slug,owner_id,stripe_customer_id,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "organizations" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (owner_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on the tenant column.
9. [CRITICAL] User B can read 1 row(s) of "organizations" that belong to user A.
- Check: cross-user-read on
organizations - Columns exposed:
id,name,slug,owner_id,stripe_customer_id,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "organizations" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (owner_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on the tenant column.
10. [CRITICAL] Anyone with the public key can read "profiles" without signing in (2+ rows returned).
- Check: anon-read on
profiles - Columns exposed:
id,full_name,email,phone,created_at - Why it matters: The rows include email, phone. The public key ships in your website's JavaScript, so this is readable by anyone.
- Fix: Enable RLS on "profiles" (alter table public.profiles enable row level security) and add policies that name the signed-in owner. If it must be public, expose a view with only the safe columns.
11. [CRITICAL] User A can read 1 row(s) of "profiles" that belong to user B.
- Check: cross-user-read on
profiles - Columns exposed:
id,full_name,email,phone,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "profiles" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on the tenant column.
12. [CRITICAL] User B can read 1 row(s) of "profiles" that belong to user A.
- Check: cross-user-read on
profiles - Columns exposed:
id,full_name,email,phone,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "profiles" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on the tenant column.
13. [CRITICAL] Anyone with the public key can read "team_directory" without signing in (2+ rows returned).
- Check: anon-read on
team_directory - Columns exposed:
id,email,full_name,created_at,last_sign_in_at - Why it matters: The rows include email. The public key ships in your website's JavaScript, so this is readable by anyone.
- Fix: Enable RLS on "team_directory" (alter table public.team_directory enable row level security) and add policies that name the signed-in owner. If it must be public, expose a view with only the safe columns.
14. [CRITICAL] Anyone can call get_org_revenue() without signing in, and it returned 1 result(s) for user B's data.
- Check: anon-rpc on
rpc/get_org_revenue - Why it matters: Functions marked SECURITY DEFINER run as the database owner and skip RLS. If anon can execute them, they are a side door.
- Fix: revoke execute on function public.get_org_revenue from anon, public; make it SECURITY INVOKER if possible, or check membership inside it, and set search_path = ''.
15. [HIGH] User A can read 1 row(s) of "memberships" that belong to user B.
- Check: cross-user-read on
memberships - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,user_id,role,client_id,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "memberships" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (user_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on org_id.
16. [HIGH] User B can read 1 row(s) of "memberships" that belong to user A.
- Check: cross-user-read on
memberships - Columns exposed:
id,org_id,user_id,role,client_id,created_at - Why it matters: One customer can see another customer's records. This is the classic multi-tenant leak, and it is invisible in the UI.
- Fix: Replace permissive policies on "memberships" (for example using (true), or auth.role() = 'authenticated') with an ownership check such as using (user_id = (select auth.uid())) or a membership check on org_id.
Row values are never printed or stored by this tool.